This was for Anthropology in Semester 2. Had soooo much fun doing this and learned heaps in the process - it really challenged my understanding of 'religion', which I mistakenly thought I knew quite a bit about. Very happy that I got to explore with this assignment and happy to share it with everyone. Anthropology has done some pretty legit work on religion, and in my opinion they've really done their research. Hope you learn even a little from this paper!
Is the definition of religion as belief adequate for describing and analysing the full range of experiences and actions we might like to label “religious”?
This essay seeks to investigate the question of whether the definition of religion as belief is adequate in encompassing the full range of experiences and actions we might label ‘religious’. I will argue that while belief underlies many religions as a central feature, belief itself is inadequate as a hard-and-fast definition of religion and is only one of many attributes comprising it. I will begin by outlining the definition of religion as we currently know it. Then I discuss the centrality of belief in religions such as Christianity, Islam, Japanese faith, and Buddhism. To conclude, I will consolidate these ideas in support of my main argument and offer comment to the definition of ‘religion’.
Over centuries, anthropologists and theologists have been conjuring various definitions of the word ‘religion’. A most famous one is by Tylor ([1871] 1920, p. 1), stating that religion is ‘belief in spiritual beings’. Boyer (2001, p. 9) identifies religion as a label we use to ‘put together all the ideas, actions, rules and objects that have to do with the existence and properties of superhuman agents such as God.’ While these definitions point to the concept of theism, it has been argued that such conceptions are largely limited to Western and Abrahamic religions (Kavanagh 2017). Bowen (2013, p. 3) thus proposes a broader definition – ‘something more to the world than meets the eye’. Religion has to do with people’s transcendental ideas of reality and their construction of the world, whether that be in relation to spiritual beings, forces, or none of that at all. This definition recognises diversity in religion across societies, such as the varying degrees to which belief is central to religious traditions (Bowen 2013, p. 4). There are many specific attributes that constitute the multifaceted concept of ‘religion’, such as the preoccupation with supernatural agents, ritual practices, an ethical code, empirically indeterminate beliefs, and so on. There thus appears to be an absence of distinct, set boundaries for what constitutes religion as it may be argued that any kind of behaviour can have a religious attribute (Southwold 1978, p. 362).
A central feature of many religious traditions in the world is belief. Like the word ‘religion’, ‘belief’ carries with it many possible definitions and interpretations. Ruel (2008, p. 100) states that ‘belief’ can refer to ‘belief in’ (e.g. trust and conviction in God) or ‘belief that’ (e.g. the view that the existence of God is true). Propositional or literal belief in the basic tenets or received ideas of a religion is usually an important part of religious behaviour, portraying religion as a cognitive system (Lindquist & Coleman 2008, p. 2 – 3; Southwold 1979, p. 628). Belief, in this sense, seems to be a ‘personal statement, a declaration of moral identity’ (Ruel 2008, p. 98). Mair (2013, p. 448) raises another interpretation of religious belief as a less reflective, habitual form of worship in order to fulfil symbolic expression. This view states that profound, supramundane truths are expressed symbolically and implicitly, through religious practice, and that religious belief is not merely about propositions, but may be about social or ethical commitments. An example is the ritual of darb al-shish among Sufi disciples which utilises bodily impalement as an expression of mystical concepts expounded by God, as proof of faith (Pinto 2012, p. 66). Whether or not belief is a fundamental characteristic of religion may thus depend on how we define it. An endeavour to solve this problem requires us to ask not about the content of belief, but the manner of belief.
In Abrahamic religions, the concept of belief is so central that Western perception of religion has come to assume that all other religious groups simply believe in different objects or agents (Smith cited in Ruel 2008, p. 97). The word ‘belief’ in Christianity relates to the Greek pistis, which expresses that ‘to believe’ in the gods is to have confidence in and obedience to them (Ruel 2008, p. 99). Pouillon ([1979] 1983, p.1) illustrates the three aspects of Christian belief: the existence of God is seen as factual; conviction and trust marks the relationship between a believer and God; God’s word is accepted as the principles of the faith. It thus appears that Christians adhere to both ‘belief in’ and ‘belief that’ at once. In apostolic writings of the New Testament, pistis eventually came to mean ‘to be converted’, in the context that followers heard the message of God and believed. This illustrates how the act of believing is fundamental to one’s identity and worldview as a Christian. The earliest creeds in Christianity were also used in the context of baptism – a physical, ritual equivalent of ‘believing’ as signifying conversion (Ruel 2008, p. 100).
Another religion that has anything equivalent to Christian belief is Islam, which emphasises the ‘five pillars’, foremost of which is faith in God (Ruel 2008, p. 106). However, a key difference is the greater emphasis in Islam on the worship in and obedience to God over the content of belief, through the ritual practices, and adherence to Islamic custom and law. A good example of this is the Sufi ritual of darb al-shish, which is a ‘proof of faith’ for followers (Pinto 2012, p. 63). Successful performance of the ritual involves piercing the abdomen of the disciple with an iron rod, but with the absence of bleeding as a result. This ‘miracle’ that takes place in the body of the disciple is symbolic of God’s love as ‘emotional, sensorial and existential realities’, proving the disciple’s conviction in God (Pinto 2012, p. 66). Unlike the emphasis on cognitive aspects of belief in Christianity, belief in Islam appears to be more symbolic than propositional. However, this propositional aspect in Islamic belief cannot be omitted since it seems to fuel such symbolic belief and religious experiences. As aptly stated by Geertz (1966, p. 3), ‘religious belief cannot be seen as involving pure induction from experience, but rather a prior acceptance of authority which transforms that experience’. Nevertheless, it is clear from the above discussion that the underlying concern behind practices and experiences in these Abrahamic faiths is that of belief.
Departing from strong endorsements of outward religious belief, it appears that Japanese approaches to religion are devoid of strong religious beliefs. Yet, there is great adherence to ritual practice during events and festivals, which tend to involve religious symbolism and transcendental concepts such as purification (Kavanagh 2017). Kavanagh argues that strong beliefs are an ancillary feature of religion in Japan and instead, practice through the performance of various activities, like visiting shrines and saying prayers, is given more importance. However, it may be argued that what Kavanagh seems to be saying is that while belief in the propositions of a religion is not given much importance in Japan, symbolic belief is certainly adhered to. Geertz (1966, p. 3) views belief as a pronounced feature of ritual, as beliefs and religious symbols are expressed lucidly through these rites. While the symbolic meaning behind such practices may not be as profound and transcendental as that of practices like darb al-shish, a closer look reveals that the belief that practical benefits can be gained through ritual practices underlies and is implied in such actions, and is thus a ‘belief in’ those practices nonetheless, whether or not they are accurate to the actual tenets of those religions (e.g. Shintoism and Buddhism). Nevertheless, as this mode of belief is less explicit, Kavanagh’s view of practice and ritualism being more significant attributes of Japanese religion may be acknowledged.
Moving from the idea that belief is central to religion, we now delve into modern evangelist Christianity, which has made unconventional departures from the traditional focus of Christianity on mere belief. Luhrmann (2004, p. 519) describes the religion as becoming more experience-centred, with focus on ritual practices and psychological techniques. It appears that while followers claim that the Bible is literally true, what is taken to be central to their relationship with God is intense, bodily, spiritual experience. These learned experiences include trance, altered consciousness and emotional states, which believers interpret as God’s presence, allowing them to ‘verify’ His existence through inward, albeit subjective, personal experience, and to experience a God more personal, intimate, and more tangibly real (Luhrmann 2004, p. 522). While underlying the faith is propositional and symbolic belief along with conviction in God, the motivation behind the experiential practice is also relational. At Horizon Christian Fellowship in Southern California, the goal of their practices is to foster a relationship with God through prayer, not merely to believe (Luhrmann 2004, p. 525). This is thus a departure from the idea that religion purely revolves around belief, but is also about connectedness.
Another religion that seems to contend the notion of the fundamentality of belief is Buddhism. Original Buddhist doctrines do not encourage propositional or symbolic belief (Mair 2013, p. 451). Buddhist texts (such as the Kalama Sutta) constantly encourage scepticism, investigation and empirical understanding towards all propositions, and as a result is removed from superstition, rites and rituals, appearing scientific (Lewis 1996, p. 263). Belief in doctrines is not given importance in being a Buddhist, and there are no traditions of ‘professing faith’. Instead, the non-theistic ‘religion’ encourages followers to put the Buddha’s teachings, seen as guidelines or advice, into practice for spiritual and mental progress, with the view that they are working hypotheses. These teachings are only to be verified by the practitioner’s direct, firsthand experiential knowledge and insight, resulting in unwavering confidence (Thanissaro 2006). Important parts of the religion include practices like meditation, the study of doctrines, and observation of an ethical code (the Five Precepts) in a practical effort to liberate oneself from the vicissitudes of life (Lewis 1996, p. 247; p. 251). With such features contrary to what is commonly found in religion, it brings us to the question of whether belief is really necessary for all religion.
However, coming to a conclusion is not that straightforward. While these features are characteristic of Buddhist teachings, they may not be qualities seen in what is known as ‘Buddhism’. For example, inner Mongolian Buddhists seem to contend the view that spiritual progress happens through practices such as meditation or ethical conduct, believing that only cultivating faith in Buddhas and bodhisattvas (beings aspiring to become Buddhas) through devotional rituals can allow followers to advance – a thinking incredibly contrary to traditional Buddhist purposes (Mair 2013, p. 454). Sinhalese Buddhists (similar to Japanese ‘Buddhists’ as previously discussed) are also inconsistent in this regard, giving importance to deities in ritual practices, believing that worldly benefits can be granted from these divine beings in exchange for ‘merits’ which followers have accumulated from the performance of good deeds (Southwold 1978, p. 365). Furthermore, Sinhalese Buddhists insist that to be a Buddhist, it is necessary to believe in the concepts karma and rebirth – a concept that is as of yet unable to be proven by conventional empirical methods (Southwold 1978, p. 373).
How has it come about that the actual Buddhist teachings have been completely turned on its head? What, then, constitutes the religion we call ‘Buddhism’? Or a more appropriate question, for that matter: is religion the doctrines or the practices of the followers of that religion? From an anthropological standpoint, where ethnographic representation is taken to illustrate the actual beliefs and practices of actual followers of the religion despite their contention with the doctrines of the religion, we may say that belief, both propositional and symbolic, has become an important part of Buddhism (Southwold 1978, p. 362). Yet coming from a community of practising Buddhists myself, this assertion goes against my identity as a Buddhist, and that of many Buddhists in communities within my knowledge. It may thus be argued that ethnographic studies of a few religious communities are not representative of the entire religion. Instead, it may be that the religion encompasses all varying modes of practices of that religion across different communities.
Taking all this into account, we may have a clearer idea of how to define the ambiguous concept of religion. While belief has traditionally been seen to be central to many religions, whether explicitly or implicitly, it is clearly not essential to religious practice worldwide. As we have seen, there are many other attributes and concepts related to religion. The word ‘religion’ can be assigned to cultural systems which have at least some specific features which we may consider to be ‘religious’, such as a central concern with godlike beings (as in the Abrahamic faiths), an ethical code, doctrines or oral traditions, rituals, a moral community (as in the Asian religions), and so on (Southwold 1978, pp. 370). Instead of referring to any single thing, religion be better recognised as a polythetic subject – to acknowledge that different religions comprise of a number of characteristics or related concepts, none of which are essential to religious belief and practice worldwide (Southwold 1978, pp. 371). Therefore, we may conclude that religion is not synonymous with belief, and that there is no singular definition for religion, as it is so richly diverse and intricately interlinked with the many dimensions of human life, globally.
References
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